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R&D Investment, Firm Performance and the Moderating Role of Systems and 
Safeguards: Evidence from Emerging Markets 
 
Abstract: The relationship between R&D and firm performance is highly dependent on the external 
environment. Therefore, this paper examined the effects of country level investor protection (safeguards) and 
governance mechanisms (systems) on the relationship between R&D and firm performance. Using GMM 
estimation and elasticity testing of panel data for 423 firms from 12 emerging countries, we find that a 
country’s safeguards tend to moderate the relationship between R&D and firm performance more than the 
system of a country. The results indicate that safeguarding is relatively more important for the relationship 
between R&D and firm performance than other country level governance mechanisms, as the former can 
easily attract outside capital when it is strong. These results have significant implications for innovation 
policy. In particular, managers may wish to strengthen investor protection to promote high R&D investment 
in order to increase firm performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Research and Development (R&D) expenditure has been treated as an important constituent 
of economic growth (Brown et al., 2009; Alam et al., 2019a). To maximise the potential 
impact of R&D investment on economic growth and development, it is essential to ensure the 
efficiency and productivity of such investment. A number of papers have found that strong 
corporate governance at both firm level and country level helps to improve the efficiency and 
productivity of R&D investment. For example, Cui and Mak (2002), Chen and Hsu (2009), 
Ayyagari et al. (2011) and Honoré et al. (2015) concluded that firm level corporate 
governance helps to improve the efficiency of R&D investment. On the other hand, authors 
such as Hillier et al. (2011), Pindado et al. (2015), Chu et al. (2016), and Alam et al. (2019b) 
have concluded that country level governance has a strong effect on the efficiency of R&D 
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investment. Although from a holistic point of view, both firm and country level governance 
are important for the productivity and efficiency of R&D investment, this paper has examined 
country level governance, assuming its relative superiority over firm level governance, as 
suggested by Doidge et al. (2007), who stated that country level variables explain 39-70% of 
a firm’s governance choices, while firm level variables explain only 4-22%. For emerging 
economies, firm level factors explain almost nothing, as the cost of adoption of those 
variables outweighs the benefits (Doidge et al., 2007). 
R&D investment involves high levels of information asymmetry. Moreover, it is risky, long 
term in nature and characterised by opacity of information (Keupp and Gassmann, 2009). 
This, in turn, leads innovative firms to face external financing constraints and agency 
conflict, both of which contribute to inefficiency of R&D investment (Xiao, 2013). Hillier et 
al. (2011) concluded that country level governance helps to reduce the agency problem and 
external financing constraints and to enhance the efficiency of R&D investment. Country 
level governance factors such as legal investor protection, financial systems, ownership 
structure and independence of the board and the market for corporate control may influence 
the relationship between R&D and firm value (Pindado et al., 2015). Although there is some 
evidence on the effect of country level governance on R&D efficiency, research on the 
relative importance of various components of the overall governance system is very rare. In 
this paper, we examine whether enhanced investor protection as a component of the 
governance system plays a more critical role to influence firm level R&D performance 
compared to other components of the country level governance system. The paper argues that 
among all the various components of the governance system, strong investor protection will 
have more impact on the relationship between R&D and firm performance. 
This paper focuses on emerging markets, considering the importance of those markets within 
the global economy. R&D investment is growing faster in emerging economies in recent 
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years (Alam et al., 2019b). Li and Kozikhode (2009) stated that the global R&D landscape is 
changing very rapidly and emerging markets are attracting more attention from multinational 
companies (MNCs) as a location for increased levels of R&D investment due to higher 
demand, lower cost and increased levels of technology adoption. Logue (2011) stated that the 
rate of return from the same investment is higher in emerging markets than in developed 
countries. As a result, in recent years, MNCs are establishing large numbers of R&D centres 
in emerging markets (Patra and Krishna, 2015). Although much of the attention is now 
towards emerging markets, the fact remains that these countries are poor in terms of 
corporate governance practices. Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) pointed out that corporate 
governance practice is particularly poor in many emerging markets. More importantly, the 
possibility of managerial expropriation is higher in those economies due to weak enforcement 
of legal rights. Thenmozhi and Narayanan (2016) argued that country level rule of law and 
the aggregate enforcement culture may overcome the weaker firm level governance and stop 
managerial expropriation by giving investors better safeguards. Moreover, country level 
governance, particularly in emerging markets, has an impact on firms’ performance by 
influencing firms’ decision-making mechanisms and strategic choices (Peng et al., 2009; 
Ruiqi et al., 2017). Therefore, it would be interesting to see whether country level governance 
in emerging economies has any influence in moderating the link between R&D and firm 
performance. 
Following Haidar (2009) and Kaufmann et al. (1999), we have separated greater investor 
protection from country level governance factors. The distinction between greater investor 
protection and country level governance is important, especially from the context of 
emerging markets, where firm level governance is poor and the possibility of managerial 
expropriation is higher (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Country level investor protection 
provides a ‘safeguard’ to the investors, as suggested by Agrawal (2013), and positively 
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influences corporate investment policy by reducing the chance of managerial expropriation. 
Therefore, in this paper, we consider greater investor protection as a ‘safeguard’. We treat 
country level governance as a ‘system’, following Sir Adrian Cadbury, who stated that 
corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury 
Committee, 1992). Using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of panel data 
for 2,471 firm-year observations consisting of 423 firms from 12 emerging countries, it is 
found that a country’s safeguards tend to have a greater moderating effect than its system. 
The results indicate that safeguards promote firm-level innovation in emerging markets, 
while systems substitute for firm-level corporate governance. Moreover, they show that 
safeguarding is relatively more important for R&D and firm performance than other country 
governance, as it easily attracts outside capital when it is strong.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and 
hypotheses relevant to the study. Section 3 introduces the data and research method, and in 
Section 4 the results are presented and discussed. Section 5 draws conclusions from this 
study. 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
R&D investment is used as a source of competitive advantage, long-term growth and 
technological advancement, which lead to better firm performance (James and McGuire, 
2016; Ruiqi et al., 2017; Patel et al., 2018). The existing literature has found a positive 
relationship between R&D and firm performance (Chan et al., 2001; Eberhart et al., 2004; 
Yeh et al., 2010). For example, Chan et al. (2001) found that corporate R&D investment is 
associated with positive value gain for the investing firms. Eberhart et al. (2004) found that 
corporate R&D investment helps to improve the operating performance of investing firms in 
the long run. However, the relationship between R&D investment and firm performance may 
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be strengthened or weakened by country-level factors. In a related study, Pindado et al. 
(2015) have shown that country-level factors moderate the relationship between R&D and 
firm performance. Chan et al. (2001) also found evidence that external corporate governance 
helps to improve the relationship between R&D and firm performance. 
R&D investment may not automatically create value for the investing firms. The agency 
conflict, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), may restrict the benefit gained from 
R&D investment. Based on the free cash flow hypothesis, Jensen (1993) concluded that 
managers may overspend their free cash flows in projects like R&D. This overinvestment 
may cause value destruction. Jensen (1993) also pointed out that value destruction in R&D 
projects may be an outcome of the failure of internal control systems. The possibility of 
limited gain from R&D investment may also stem from the higher financing cost associated 
with R&D projects due to the risky nature of R&D (Hillier et al., 2011). However, La Porta et 
al. (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Hsu et al. (2014) pointed out that better country 
level governance mechanisms, including investor protection, legal systems and financial 
development, may help to overcome the agency problem. Hillier et al. (2011), Xiao (2013), 
Pindado et al. (2015), and Chu et al. (2016) have concluded that country level governance 
encourages R&D and improves the efficiency of R&D investment. Existing literature on the 
relationship between R&D and firm performance has so far identified a number of factors 
that moderate this relationship. For example, Hillier et al. (2011) and Pindado et al. (2015) 
highlighted the role of investor protection, financial development and control mechanisms, 
while Xiao (2013) and Chu et al. (2016) focused on the rule of law and investor protection. 
For emerging markets, where the overall corporate governance system is poor and the 
possibility of managerial expropriation is high (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013), greater 
investor protection should play a more critical role in influencing the R&D-performance link 
compared to other components of the governance system. Strong investor protection reduces 
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the possibility of managerial expropriation (Agrawal, 2013) and makes the investors 
confident in making risky investments even in markets where general governance is poor. 
Therefore, in emerging markets, greater investor protection should have more explanatory 
power in explaining firm profitability from R&D investment compared to other components 
of the governance system. Following Haidar (2009) and Kaufmann et al. (1999), and in line 
with our main research argument about the relative importance of greater investor protection, 
country level governance factors are separated in this study into two groups. Haidar (2009) 
used a revised definition of investor protection that represents greater protection for investors 
and includes disclosure, liabilities and shareholder suits. Following Kaufmann et al. (1999), 
this study has considered rule of law, government quality, political stability, corruption and 
accountability as a collective governance system. We are proposing that greater investor 
protection (safeguard) and collective governance system (system) will have differential 
impact on the relationship between R&D and firm performance. Figure 1 explains this 
conceptual model. 
Please insert Figure 1 about here 
Researchers have long been trying to measure the relationship between R&D and firm 
performance. However, the results have been inconclusive. Ehie and Oilbe (2010) and 
Gunday et al. (2011) found a significant positive relationship, while Chan et al. (1990) and 
Knecht (2013) found a negative relationship between R&D intensity and firm performance. 
Although there has been a debate as to whether R&D investment contributes to firm 
performance, we argue that R&D investment may not influence firm performance in the same 
year, as new product development, new production methods and information technology need 
time to show results. Moreover, due to its uncertain, risky and costly nature, the R&D process 
may not always satisfy the current market demands (Liao and Rice, 2010). In a related study, 
Knecht (2013) pointed out that the current year’s R&D investment reduces current year 
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profits but may impact positively on future firm performance. Moreover, Parcharidis and 
Varsakelis (2007) and Natasha and Hutagaol (2009) found that R&D investment impacts 
negatively on profit for the year of the investment, but there may be a strong positive 
relationship after two years. Similarly, Kothari et al. (2002) and Pandit et al. (2011) found 
evidence that R&D activities contribute to firms’ future performance. It has been argued that 
firms’ investment in R&D can be more productive and cost effective, reduce earnings 
volatility and generate better profit margin in future periods (Eberhart et al., 2004; Pandit et 
al. 2011; Bond and Guceri, 2017; Yoo et al.,2019), which is considered as the real value of 
R&D. Therefore, based on the above analysis, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a negative relationship between R&D and concurrent firm 
performance. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a positive relationship between the previous year’s R&D and 
current firm performance. 
Although there could be a positive relationship between the current year’s R&D/previous 
year’s R&D and future performance/current performance, this relationship could be stronger 
in the presence of strong investor protection. Since the seminal works of La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998), researchers have found that investor protection has a significant impact on firm 
finance, investment and growth. Investor protection law increases investor confidence, both 
legally and psychologically. Anderson and Gupta (2009) argued that stronger investor 
protection assures investors that, besides their original investment, more of the firm’s profits 
will get back to them as dividends and interests. This protection encourages investors and 
entrepreneurs to pay more for financial assets that increase the R&D investment of a firm. 
Moreover, investor protection ensures access to external financing, and therefore has a 
significant impact on investment in R&D activities (Brown et al., 2013). In addition, investor 
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protection influences the relationship between R&D and firm performance by improving the 
efficiency of a firm’s R&D investment. Pindado et al. (2015) found that effective investor 
protection leads to a positive relationship between R&D and market value, while Xiao (2013) 
found that stronger investor protection facilitates faster sales growth in R&D-intensive 
industries. From the above discussion, the following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 2: Investor protection (safeguard) positively moderates the strength of the 
relationship between R&D and firm performance. 
In making strategic decisions on risky and uncertain investments such as R&D, firms 
consider the background of institutional or country-level governance factors (Alam et al., 
2019b). Wu et al. (2016) stated that the institutional environment may stimulate R&D activity 
by providing capacities or constraints beyond those of individual firms. Moreover, Peng et al. 
(2008) stated that strategic choices such as R&D investment are driven by the institutional 
framework confronting managers, along with industry conditions and firm-specific resources. 
In addition, Hiller et al. (2011) argued that better governance ensures greater disclosure and 
accountability, which in turn facilitates the availability of external financing for R&D. These 
results indicate that, when country-level governance becomes stronger, financial factors 
become more effective in boosting R&D investment. They found that country-level 
governance factors reduce the sensitivity of R&D to internal cash flows. Moreover, 
dimensions of country-level governance are also related to better performance (Gugler et al., 
2013). In line with this result, Pindado et al. (2015) found that country-level governance 
factors significantly influence the market valuation of firms’ R&D investment. Following 
Pindado et al. (2015), the following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 3: Country-level governance (system) positively moderates the strength of the 
relationship between R&D and firm performance. 
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3. Data, model and method 
3.1 Data, Sample Selection and Variables 
Data were collected from several sources for the sample period of 2006-2013, including 
DataStream, the World Bank’s Protecting Minority Shareholders data, and the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. The post-reform period of R&D reporting was chosen 
so that the sample firms would treat R&D expenditure homogeneously, following Alam et al. 
(2019b). Firm-level data were drawn from DataStream, including R&D expenditure, fixed 
assets, total assets, total debt, sales, earnings before income and tax (EBIT), and return on 
invested capital (ROIC). Then, in order to control for the effect of inflation over time, the 
nominal values of all variables were deflated by the annual inflation rate
1
. Investor protection 
data, measured in terms of disclosure, liability and ability of investors to sue, were obtained 
from the World Bank’s Protecting Minority Shareholders data. Data on country-level 
governance factors, measured in terms of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule 
of law, control of corruption, political stability and accountability, were obtained from the 
ICRG database.  
We applied several sample selection criteria. In order to be included in the sample, firms 
must have at least five consecutive years of data to control for short panel bias (see Flannery 
and Hankins, 2013). We included countries that have at least 40 firm-year observations, 
following Anton et al. (2019). Moreover, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan 
were excluded, as these countries are now considered as emerged economies. Following 
Pindado et al. (2015), financial firms were excluded due to their differing corporate structure 
and strategy. In addition to this, as DataStream contains some missing and unrealistic figures 
(such as negative values of R&D expenditure), after dropping those values the dataset 
                                                     
1 We collected annual inflation rates from the World Bank country level database. 
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consisted of 423 firms from 12 emerging countries
2
 (see Table 1). Several sources of data and 
sample selection criteria, particularly missing data, lead to unbalanced panel data. In a 
relevant study, Hillier et al. (2011) states that unbalanced panel data helps to mitigate the 
survivorship bias problem. In addition, Arellano (2003) argues that estimations based on 
unbalanced panel data are as reliable as those based on balanced panel data. 
Please insert Table 1 about here 
Table 2 shows definitions of the variables. Following Yeh et al. (2010), this study has used 
ROA as the dependent variable. In addition to ROA, ROIC is also considered as a dependent 
variable to observe the impact of country-level factors. R&D intensity has been used as an 
independent variable and is measured by dividing total R&D expenditure by sales, as 
suggested by Honoré et al. (2015). Another important independent variable that has been 
used in this study is investor protection. La Porta et al. (2000) observed that investor 
protection should include rights to receive dividends on pro rata terms; to vote for directors; 
to participate in shareholders’ meetings; to subscribe to new issues of securities on the same 
terms as insiders; to sue directors or the majority for suspected expropriation; and to call 
extraordinary shareholders’ meetings. Djankov et al. (2006) introduced a further measure of 
investor protection against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. 
They argued that this new measure predicts a variety of stock market outcomes and works 
better than the previous anti-directors index. However, La Porta et al.’s measurements of 
investor protection have been criticised by several authors. For example, Siems (2006) 
criticises the choice of variables by La Porta et al. as those variables represent significant US 
bias and also fall short of including some of the significant aspects of law. 
                                                     
2To mitigate the potential bias from the dominant country in the sample, we ran separate regressions, except for India. We find similar 




In this study, investor protection variables are measured following Haidar (2009). The three 
components of the Doing Business investor protection index are disclosure, liability and 
investor suits. Disclosure measures the transparency of transactions and is further subdivided 
into five sub-indices that include a corporate body that can provide legal approval for 
transactions; disclosure of transactions to the public; mandatory disclosure in annual reports; 
mandatory disclosure to the board of directors or supervisor; and pre-audit by an external 
body. Liability measures directors’ liabilities, and includes sub-indices like investors’ ability 
to be included in the approving body, directors and members of supervisory boards being 
liable for damages due to acting negligently or being influenced by the approving body. 
Investor suits measures investors’ rights to sue officials and directors for misconduct and is 
composed of sub-indices like whether investors can obtain relevant documents from a 
company and can recover legal expenses. Investor protection is the sum of the average of 
disclosure, liability and investor suits, and the shareholder governance index. The index 
ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating stronger investor protection. Dummy 
variables are used for each component: disclosure, liability and investor suits, where values 
higher than the median are assigned the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. 
Following Kaufmann et al. (1999), country-level corporate governance (system) is measured 
by using six components, comprising government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, control of corruption, political stability and accountability. Different index ranges have 
been used, such as government effectiveness from 0 to 4; regularity quality and political 
stability from 0 to 12; rule of law corruption, and accountability from 0 to 6, with higher 
values indicating stronger institutions. Dummy variables are used for each component, with 
values higher than the median taking a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Following Majumdar 
(1997), Artz et al. (2010), Ehie and Olibe (2010), García-Manjón and Romero-Merino 
(2012), Pindado et al. (2015), Alam et al. (2019a), Alam et al. (2019b), and Anton (2019), 
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this study has used several firm level control variables, including firm size, sales growth, 
leverage, tangibility, financial crisis, and also industry dummy to control the industry effect.  
Due to various diverse capabilities such as ability to exploit economies of scales and scope, 
formalisation of procedures and implementation of effective operations, larger firms generate 
superior performance than smaller firms (Penrose, 1959; Majumdar, 1997). Therefore, we 
expect a positive relationship between firm size and firm performance. Firm size is measured 
as the natural logarithm of total assets, following Alam et al. (2019a) and Anton (2019). Sales 
growth of the firm motivates managers, retains talented employees, and experiences 
increasing profitability (Jovanovic, 1982; Brush et al., 2000). Brush et al. (2000) pointed out 
that growth may provide extra market power, which firms can use to increase performance. In 
a related study, Frank (1988) found that firm growth is a good signal of the firm’s 
performance expectations and hence implies a positive relation between sales growth and 
firm performance. Sales growth is measured as annual sales growth of the firm, following 
Alam (2019a). Lazar (2016) found evidence that leverage is one of the key determinants of 
firm performance. It is argued that increase in debt creates agency cost, and debt overhang 
may create underinvestment problems, which weaken firm performance (Myers, 1977; 
Ibhagui and Olokoyo, 2018). Based on emerging European firms, Anton (2019) found that 
leverage negatively affects firms’ growth. Following Anton (2019), we expect a negative 
relationship between leverage and firm performance. Leverage is measured as total debt over 
total assets, following Alam et al. (2019b) and Anton (2019). Previous studies show that 
higher tangible assets lead firms to face more financial constraints. As a result, firms might 
be affected adversely in terms of their ability to make investment (Fazzari et al. 1988; Aghion 
et al., 2004; Hillier et al, 2011). Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between 
tangibility and firm performance. We have measured tangibility as fixed assets over total 
assets, following Hillier et al. (2011). Claessens et al. (2011) stated that due to greater 
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sensitivity to aggregate demand and international trade, financial crisis decreases firms’ 
performance. During the recent global crisis period, there was an equity value reduction of 
more than $29 trillion and the equity market dropped more than 56% (Chen et al., 2014; Lee 
et al., 2017). Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between financial crisis and firm 
performance. We created a dummy variable to control for the financial crisis effect, which 
takes the value of 1 if the year is between 2007 and 2009 and 0 otherwise, following 
Beuselinck et al. (2017). All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to restrict the 
influence of outliers. 
Please insert Table 2 about here 
3.2 Summary statistics 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 report the descriptive statistics of the sample by firm, industry and country 
respectively. They are presented in three separate tables to provide a clearer picture of the 
sample. The firm-level data (Table 3) indicate that, except for ROIC, the values of variables 
do not vary across firms over time. ROIC has a high standard deviation of 11.01, indicating 
that this value varies greatly across firms over time. Moreover, the high standard deviations 
of the firm size and sales growth variables confirm variation in firm observations. It is a 
common belief that firm size and firm growth vary in all countries worldwide. Table 4 clearly 
shows that technology-based firms invest more in R&D than do those in non-technology-
based sectors, with a difference of approximately 34%. Tabrizi (2005) also points out that 
technology-based firms spend more on R&D than do non-technology-based firms. In general, 
technology-based firms place more weight on bringing new knowledge to the markets, 
advancing technology, and increasing employee skills, internal competencies and capabilities. 
These results support considering control of the industry effect in the model. 
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Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for country-level factors, including investor protection 
and country-level governance variables. Investor protection may vary not only by firm but 
also by country. Israel, Malaysia and South Africa have higher than average values for each 
of the investor protection components, which ensure balanced and strong investor 
protection. In contrast, in several countries, such as China, Indonesia and Russia, 
investor protection components vary greatly, indicating unbalanced and low investor 
protection. For instance, China has a disclosure index of 10, which is strong, but its score 
for the directors’ liability index is 1, which indicates weak investor protection. On the 
other hand, Malaysia has higher-than-average values for country-level governance 
components, indicating a strong, balanced governance system. Russia’s government 
effectiveness and Pakistan’s voice and accountability are very low compared with other 
countries. Most interestingly, emerging countries still suffer from a lack of control of 
corruption. The data shows that this value is low compared with other components. Among 
emerging countries, only Malaysia has higher than average values for both investor 
protection and country governance factors. When compared with the median, India, Israel, 
South Africa, and Malaysia have stronger investor protection, while Greece has higher 
governance. This suggests that, among the sample countries, investor protection is stronger 
than governance. 
Please insert Table 3 about here 
Please insert Table 4 about here 
Please insert Table 5 about here 
In order to examine the impact of the influence of country governance factors on the 
relationship between R&D spending and firm performance, the following model was devised.  
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Performanceit= αi + β1(Performanceit-1) + β2(R&D Intensityit) + β3 ln(Firm Sizeit) + 
β4(Sales growthit) + β5(Leverageit) +β6(Tangibilityit)+ β7(Financial crisisit)+  
β8(R&D*Investor protectionit)+ β9(R&D*Country governanceit)+ηi+dt+Ii + vit (1) 
Subscript i represents the country and t represents the year. Here, αi, and β1to β15 represent 
relationships between performance and the explanatory variables. The error component εit is 
separated into four sub-components εit= ηi+ dt+ Ii + vit, while ηi is considered as an 
individual effect to control for individual heterogeneity, which is then eliminated by taking 
first differences. The time dummy, denoted by dt, captures the time-specific effect to control 
for macroeconomic variables on R&D and performance. As the industries are separated into 
technology-based and non-technology-based, an industry dummy Ii is used to capture 
industry-specific effects. vit is a random disturbance term which is assumed to be i.i.d. 
normal. 
3.3 Method 
In order to examine the moderating effect of investor protection and country governance on 
the relationship between R&D investment and firm performance, a two-step system
3
 GMM 
estimation was performed, following Alam et al. (2019a). System GMM is consistent with 
panel data structure and it is efficient when a panel has a smaller time dimension (T equals 8) 
compared to its cross-sectional dimension (N equals 423) (Asongu et al., 2018). System 
GMM estimation helps to address omitted variable bias, measurement errors, unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity (Teixeira and Queirós, 2016; Mthanti and Ojah, 2017; Alam et 
                                                     
3We used system GMM instead of difference GMM, as system GMM has been found to be more efficient than difference 
GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998), while difference GMM estimation has a problem of weak instruments (Alonso-Borrego 
and Arellano, 1999). A two-step estimation was performed on the grounds that it produces more efficient estimates than one-
step estimation. In two-step estimation, the standard covariance matrix is robust to panel-specific heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation, but the standard errors are downward biased. To fix the possible downward bias, the Windmeijer (2005) 




al., 2019b), which may arise due to reverse causality. Reverse causality may arise because 
R&D investment has an impact on firm performance (Ehie and Olibe, 2010), but performance 
may also impact R&D investment, as a higher firm value may encourage managers to 
commence new R&D activities (Pindado et al., 2015). The presence of this reverse causality 
(i.e. simultaneity bias) may render the OLS regressions results unreliable (Frijns et al., 2014). 
Moreover, as the current performance of firms may influence their future performance, the 
lag of performance (a dependent variable) was included as a regressor. Using lag of 
performance as an independent variable while performance is the dependent variable may 
cause problems while we use the ‘fixed effect’ or ‘random effect’ model. However, this 
problem could be avoided by using the system GMM method (Teixeira and Queirós, 2016). 
Since the first difference of all variables was taken in order to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, first-order autocorrelation in the residuals is expected. The results of first-
order autocorrelation AR(1) in the first difference residuals show that the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation is rejected in all models. However, second-order autocorrelation AR(2) in 
the first difference residuals is unable to reject the null hypothesis, which suggests the 
presence of no autocorrelation. This confirms that the dynamic lag structure of the models is 
sufficient (i.e. one lag for the firm performance variable). 
 
The acceptability of the dynamic GMM estimation mostly depends on the use of valid 
instruments in the analysis. As we are using system GMM, lagged values such as t-1, t-2 and 
t-3 for the difference equation and one lag for the level equation are used. The Hansen J 
statistic of over-identifying restrictions was applied to test the validity of the instruments, and 
the results show that the instruments are valid in the models. Moreover, the Difference-in-
Hansen test of exogeneity shows that the subset of instruments that are used for the equations 
in levels is exogenous. Teixeira and Queirós (2016) pointed out that system GMM may suffer 
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from an instrument proliferation problem. However, in order to choose the best possible 
instruments, there should be a trade-off between exogeneity and the strength of each 
instrument, as suggested by Keasey et al. (2015). In relation to this, a number of past studies 
also suggested that the number of instruments, i, should be less than the number of groups, n, 
which are firms in our study (i.e. Asiedu and Lien, 2011; Mthanti and Ojah, 2017). The 
standard value of the ratio should be more than one and our results suggest that the group-to-
instruments ratio (r = n/i) is above 1 for all the models that we have used. In addition to this, 
two Wald tests were used to examine the joint significance of the explanatory variables, z 1 , 
and the joint significance time dummy, z 2 . These have provided good results for our models. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
Table 6 presents the results of the GMM estimation. Seven models (1 to 7) were used to 
examine the moderating effects. Model 1 is the basic model of this estimation, the results of 
which show that current year’s R&D intensity and current year’s performance have a 
negative relationship. With a one-unit change in R&D intensity, firm performance changes by 
0.2875 units. This is in line with Parcharidis and Varsakelis (2007), who obtained a negative 
relationship between R&D investment and firm performance in the concurrent year. This 
implies that R&D intensity takes time to show returns on the investment, confirming the 
general view that R&D intensity does not create benefits in the same year. Therefore, the 
results strongly support Hypothesis 1a. As R&D investment is long term in nature and takes 
time to affect firm performance, it is expected that R&D has a positive impact on firms’ 
future performance. As expected, the results show that lag of R&D has a positive but 
insignificant impact on firm performance. Although the results do not fully support our 
hypothesis 1b, this finding is aligned with our notion that R&D alone cannot automatically 
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create value for the investing firms. Institutional quality may strengthen or weaken this 
relationship. 
Please insert Table 6 about here 
In Model 2, the interaction terms of the investor protection index are added. The lagged R&D 
intensity is interacted with the investor protection index. The positive coefficient on the 
interaction term suggests that investor protection has a significant influence on R&D 
spending in increasing firm performance. The results remain robust in Model 6 after 
including the country governance index in the regression. This implies that investor 
protection enhances the performance of R&D investment by facilitating external finance 
(Hiller et al., 2011), reduces managers’ opportunistic behaviour in diverting cash flows to 
themselves (Ghosh and He, 2015) and capital allocation (Xiao, 2013), which in turn increase 
firm performance. Similar results were also reported by Xiao (2013). These results confirm 
the moderating role of investor protection on the relationship between R&D and firm 
performance. Therefore, the results support Hypothesis 2. 
In Model 3, in order to examine which aspects of investor protection drive the positive effect 
on firm performance, the investor protection index is split into three sub-components: 
disclosure, directors’ liability and shareholder suits. The base model shows that lagged value 
of R&D intensity and firm performance have a positive but statistically insignificant 
relationship, but the relationship becomes positive and significant when the interaction terms, 
except disclosure, are present. These results suggest that R&D intensity influences firm 
performance when directors are more liable for their activities, which makes them more 
accountable for their decisions. The positive relationship between R&D intensity, shareholder 
suits and firm performance is consistent with the idea that the possibility of shareholder suits 
puts pressure on directors to make investments, such as into R&D, that will enhance firm 
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value. Directors’ liability and shareholder suits remain robust when new governance variables 
are added into the regression in Model 7. In addition, disclosure becomes significant. The 
negative coefficient of the interaction term of disclosure and R&D investment implies that 
disclosure of R&D-related activities does not influence firm performance. This result is not 
surprising, given the fact that traditional style disclosure of R&D through financial statements 
fails to convey complete information to investors (Lev, 1999; Aboody and Lev, 2000). The 
situation could be improved by following more voluntary disclosure of qualitative 
information regarding R&D to mitigate information asymmetry (Merkley, 2010), but this 
would be difficult for emerging markets, as the extent of voluntary disclosure in those 
markets is very inadequate (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). 
In Model 4, the country governance index is interacted. The results show that the interaction 
between the country governance index and the lagged value of R&D investment has no 
influence on firm performance. This is because firm-level governance has a greater influence 
than country governance on strategic decisions such as R&D in generating firm performance. 
This result is consistent with the findings of Durnev and Kim (2005) and Hugill and Siegel 
(2014), who concluded that firm level governance factors dominate over country level 
governance in emerging markets. More specifically, they found that governance variables 
such as board independence, ownership structure and financial development are more 
influential at firm level in emerging markets. Therefore, in the case of governance systems, 
firm level factors play a more critical role in moderating firm performance compared to 
country level factors, and this is evident from our result. Therefore, the results do not support 
Hypothesis 3. 
In order to examine aspects of country governance in greater depth, country governance is 
sub-divided into government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption, political stability, and voice and accountability. It can be seen from the results of 
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Model 5 that only government effectiveness, control of corruption and voice and 
accountability have a positive influence on the lagged value of R&D intensity and firm 
performance. In an empirical study, Mahmood and Rufin (2005) stated that government 
effectiveness accelerates the technological innovation through the spillover effect and by 
creating networks between firms and individuals. Moreover, greater government capacity 
may promote R&D investment by providing greater support, budgets and subsidies for 
creative and innovative activities, which in turn increases firm performance. Moreover, 
control of corruption may facilitate the size of R&D investment, as it motivates innovation-
related FDI and reduces investment costs. Veracierto (2008) stated that detecting corruption 
or controlling corruption by imposing penalties can result in a large increase in R&D 
investment, which may improve ethical standards and speed up the work of officials, and 
therefore, may improve firm performance. A high level of accountability of managers and 
directors to shareholders influences the relationship between R&D and firm performance. 
Voice and accountability ensures the responsible behaviour of managers, which influences 
investments in general and R&D investment in particular. Moreover, high accountability 
ensures responsible decisions, actions and commitment to accomplishing the task. In 
addition, high accountability guarantees organisational learning and innovation. Interestingly, 
in Model 7, when three more variables of investor protection are introduced into the 
regression, these country-level governance variables become insignificant. These results 
suggest that investor protection, whether aggregate (Model 6) or separate (Model 7), tend to 
have a greater influence on the relationship between R&D and firm performance. 
ROAt-1 impacts positively on firm performance, indicating the persistent performance of the 
firm: this is consistent with the findings of Artz et al. (2010), who stated that the current 
performance of a firm is dependent to some extent on past performance. Firm performance is 
also influenced by firm size. A larger firm size indicates greater assets, higher capacity, 
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higher investment and greater human capital, which help to utilise more resources and obtain 
greater returns. Majumder (1997) also obtained similar results. The coefficient of sales 
growth is positive and significant, implying that growth opportunities help firms to expand 
knowledge, skills and abilities, and to provide new products to customers, which in turn 
increases firm performance. Asimakopoulos et al. (2009) also found that firm growth has a 
positive impact on firm performance. In contrast, leverage shows a negative impact on firm 
performance, consistent with the findings reported by Asimakopoulos et al. (2009). The 
negative relationship between leverage and firm performance has been also reported by 
Anton (2019) in a sample of firms from emerging Europe. This is because high leverage 
increases the probability of bankruptcy. Similarly, tangibility and firm performance are 
negatively related. The results suggest that greater tangibility indicates higher fixed assets, 
such as equipment and buildings, and lower investment, and in turn lower return. Hillier et al. 
(2011) also found that tangibility has a negative impact on R&D investment, which in turn 
reduces firm performance. As expected, the financial crisis adversely affected firm 
performance during the sample period. Claessens et al.’s (2011) study also reached similar 
conclusion. It is argued that due to the recent financial crisis, firms’ sales, profits, exports, 
FDI, and even sources of finance were reduced, which caused adverse effects on overall firm 
performance. 
4.1 Robustness Test 
In order to test the robustness of the models, ROIC is considered as a dependent variable. 
ROIC measures the efficiency of the firm on the basis of capital investment, expressed as 
profit per dollar of invested capital. ROIC has advantages over ROA in measuring 
profitability. For example, it does not include non-operating items in measuring profitability. 
Moreover, ROA can easily be skewed when a firm has excess cash. In contrast, ROIC 
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overcomes these shortcomings. Moreover, it helps to compare firms with different financial 
structures. Thus, robustness was tested using ROIC. 
Table 7 reports the results of GMM estimation, where ROIC is the dependent variable. The 
results show that investor protection factors interacting with R&D have a significant impact 
on firm performance. All the results in Models 1, 2, 4 and 7 are similar to those for ROA. In 
Model 3, the results show that disclosure and R&D jointly negatively impact firm 
performance. This implies that higher disclosure of R&D negatively impacts firm 
performance. Therefore, R&D disclosure principles play a vital role. If R&D costs are treated 
as an expense in the period in which they are incurred, net income decreases. In Model 5, the 
composite country governance index becomes significant. This is because the capital 
investments (ROIC) rather than total assets (ROA) of a firm are influenced by both investor 
protection and country governance. The implication is that the external environment is very 
important for investment and for the ability to gain returns on it. In Model 6, the results 
become robust, as control of corruption and voice and accountability, together with R&D, has 
an impact on firm performance. The results for government effectiveness, control of 
corruption and voice and accountability remain the same as for ROA. On the other hand, 
political stability negatively influences R&D investment. This is because political stability 
varies greatly between emerging markets because many are less democratic and less 
accountable to their people, and this discourages foreign investment in innovative activities. 
From the test for robustness, it can be concluded that safeguards (investor protection) have a 
greater impact on the relationship between R&D and firm performance than systems (country 
governance). 
Please insert Table 7 about here 
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4.2 Comparing systems and safeguards 
In addition to the GMM estimation, we performed an elasticity test to compare the relative 
strength of systems and safeguards in moderating the relationship between R&D and firm 
performance. The elasticity test gives a homogenous base for comparison between the 
variables (Hillier et al., 2011; Alam et al., 2019b). Following Hillier et al. (2011), we 





Where I represents the institutional variables, 𝛽𝑖 indicates its coefficient, 𝑋𝑖 is its mean, and 
𝛽𝑝X captures the predicted value of the dependent variable evaluated at the mean of each 
regressor. 
The test results show that safeguarding is more influential than the system in moderating the 
relationship between R&D and firm performance. Table 8 shows that the elasticity of 
safeguards (0.16911) is much higher than the elasticity of systems (0.03036). In a similar 
study based on a developed country, Hillier et al. (pp. 3, 2011) also compared country level 
governance factors and found that safeguards are the most important factor which reduces the 
R&D and cash flow sensitivity. This means that safeguards have more explanatory power 
than systems to facilitate R&D investment. 
Please insert Table 8 about here 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has examined whether better investor protection (safeguards) has a more critical 
role in moderating the relationship between R&D and firms’ performance than other 
components of country level governance (system). Using unbalanced panel data from 12 
emerging countries covering 423 firms and applying the GMM estimation method, this paper 
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has found strong evidence that, in emerging markets, safeguards play a more critical role than 
systems in moderating the relationship between R&D investment and firms’ performance. 
The results show that R&D investment generates higher profits in countries where investor 
protection (safeguards) is stronger. More insightful information is provided when investor 
protection is separated into the sub-components of disclosure index, liability index and 
shareholder suits index. The results indicate that R&D intensity influences firm performance 
when directors are more liable for their activities. Moreover, the positive relationship 
between R&D intensity, shareholder suits and firm performance is consistent with the idea 
that the possibility of shareholder suits puts pressure on managers and directors to make 
investments such as in R&D that will enhance firm value. However, disclosure shows a 
negative impact when ROIC is considered as the dependent variable. This is because, if R&D 
costs are treated as an expense in the period in which they are incurred, net income is 
decreased. Moreover, lack of voluntary disclosure in emerging markets makes it relatively 
weaker to influence corporate decisions. The results also indicate that the combined country 
governance factor (system) has little influence on R&D investment and firm performance. 
This suggests that firm-level governance factors may be more influential in firm-level 
strategic decisions such as R&D in emerging markets. These results are also confirmed by 
additional robustness tests. Moreover, the elasticity test conducted in this study also confirms 
that the relationship between R&D and performance is more sensitive to safeguard factors 
than system factors in emerging economies. 
The results in this study have important implications for researchers, policy makers and 
investors. It has been documented that firm level governance systems are poor in many 
emerging economies (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). This state of emerging economies may 
discourage both domestic and international investors from making risky investments such as 
R&D. However, the results of this study confirm that strong country level investor protection 
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may be a solution to overcome this underinvestment problem by giving investors more 
protection against firm level inefficient governance. Firms can improve the profitability by 
increasing R&D investments in emerging markets where country level investor protection is 
sufficient, ignoring the weaknesses of micro level governance. Doidge et al. (2007) pointed 
out that, for emerging economies, firm level governance should not be given importance, as 
the cost of adopting such governance variables outweighs the benefits. Therefore, putting 
more emphasis on country level investor protection, as suggested by our results in this study, 
also helps to avoid costly effort to fix the firm level governance. Although this paper has 
explored the country level investor protection and governance factors based on the earlier 
findings that country level factors are more influential than firm level factors, future research 
may use firm level factors along with country level factors to see the combined impact of 
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Countries No. of firms 
Initial search on DataStream  51 34,528 
Firms with five consecutive years of data 39 2,657 
Countries have at least 40 firm-year observations 16 1,625 
Dropped: Countries that are already emerged 4 1,202 
Final sample 12 423 
    Source: DataStream 
Table 2: Definition of Variables 
Data Type Variable Description 
Firm data: Return on assets (ROA) Earnings before interest and tax over assets 
ROIC Earnings over invested capital 
R&D intensity R&D expenditure of the firm in a year over sales 
Firm size Natural logarithm of firm’s total assets 
Sales growth Changes in sales over sales 
Leverage Total debt over total assets 
Tangibility Fixed assets over total assets 
 
Financial crisis Financial crisis takes the value 1 if the year is between 
2007-2009 period, and 0 otherwise 
Industry data Industry dummy Takes a value of 1 if the firm is in technology-based 
                                                     
4




Investor protection: Disclosure Measures the transparency of transactions 
Liability Measures directors’ liabilities 
Investor suits Measures investors’ rights to sue for misconduct 
Country 
governance: 
Government effectiveness Captures the ability of a country’s government 
Regulatory quality Captures the riskiness of investments 
Rule of law Captures the quality of the jurisdiction 
Control of corruption Measures the misuse of power for private gain 
Political stability Measures the propensity for changes in government, 
terrorism and violence 




Table 3: Sample by firm 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
ROA 0.09419 0.08632 -0.12399 0.37425 
ROIC 11.00860 11.01015 -15.9300 53.8400 
R&D intensity 0.01252 0.02550 0.00000 0.17322 
Firm size 5.57293 0.84089 3.93788 7.72246 
Sales growth 0.12373 0.25528 -0.49473 1.11524 
Leverage 0.26688 0.17460 0.00155 0.69098 
Tangibility 0.48020 0.18483 0.10609 0.89593 
Financial crisis 0.39426 0.48878 0.00000 1.00000 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
    
Table 4: Sample by Industry 
  Technology based Industry Non-technology based Industry 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
ROA 0.09493 0.08419 -0.12399 0.36015 0.09287 0.09004 -0.12892 0.37425 
ROIC 11.19471 10.70766 -14.2000 53.8400 10.67583 11.52904 -15.9300 40.39000 
R&D intensity 0.01640 0.02939 0.00000 0.17322 0.00559 0.01392 0.00000 0.06317 
Firm Size 5.53466 0.83705 3.93788 7.72246 5.64137 0.84379 3.03654 7.36283 
Sales growth 0.13175 0.26433 -0.49473 1.11030 0.10939 0.23768 -0.40952 1.11524 
Leverage 0.25169 0.16834 0.00155 0.67026 0.29406 0.18221 0.00125 0.69098 
Tangibility 0.46215 0.18541 0.09778 0.89593 0.51247 0.17942 0.10609 0.79534 
Financial crisis 0.39278 0.48850 0.00000 1.00000 0.39692 0.48949 0.00000 1.00000 
Source: Authors' calculation 
         
36 
 























































































































































































India 171 40.4255 0.0126 6.0000 4.0000 7.3856 5.8157 0.7500 0.6581 0.6700 0.4072 0.5581 0.8300 0.6443 
Turkey 68 16.0757 0.0060 8.6597 4.0000 5.0000 5.8979 0.5000 0.5965 0.6621 0.4200 0.5501 0.5480 0.5474 
China 52 12.2931 0.0163 10.0000 1.0000 3.9362 4.9553 0.5000 0.5539 0.6616 0.3550 0.7203 0.3768 0.5282 
Israel 27 6.3830 0.0482 7.0000 9.0000 9.0000 8.3000 1.0000 0.8200 0.8300 0.5000 0.5017 0.7100 0.7277 
South Africa 21 4.9645 0.0027 8.0000 8.0000 8.0000 8.0000 0.5000 0.7919 0.4114 0.4314 0.7027 0.8300 0.6118 
Malaysia 19 4.4917 0.0035 10.0000 9.0000 7.0000 8.7000 0.7500 0.7658 0.6700 0.4200 0.7142 0.7751 0.6838 
Greece 18 4.2553 0.0102 1.3306 3.6364 5.0000 3.3066 0.7500 0.7079 0.7500 0.3300 0.7256 0.9200 0.6959 
Indonesia 12 2.8369 0.0046 9.5294 5.0000 3.0000 5.8588 0.5000 0.6759 0.5000 0.4925 0.6080 0.6300 0.5708 
Philippines 10 2.3641 0.0032 2.0000 3.0000 8.0000 4.3000 0.7500 0.7266 0.4200 0.3394 0.6772 0.6885 0.5993 
Russia 9 2.1277 0.0048 6.0000 2.0000 6.0000 4.7000 0.2500 0.7421 0.6202 0.3066 0.6333 0.5555 0.5167 
Brazil 8 1.8913 0.0230 5.0000 8.0000 3.0000 5.3000 0.5000 0.5947 0.3353 0.4529 0.7098 0.7500 0.5569 
Pakistan 8 1.8913 0.0070 6.0000 6.0000 7.0000 6.3000 0.5000 0.5859 0.5357 0.3200 0.4466 0.3166 0.4509 
Total 423 100 
            
Min. 
  
0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 3.0000 3.0000 0.2500 0.5000 0.3300 0.2500 0.4300 0.2500 0.4400 
Max. 
  
0.1732 10.0000 9.0000 9.0000 8.7000 1.0000 0.8600 0.8300 0.5000 0.8000 0.9200 0.7300 
Mean 
  
0.0125 7.0439 4.4872 6.3946 5.9806 0.6578 0.6621 0.6484 0.4062 0.5993 0.6993 0.6120 
Median     0.0035 6.0000 4.0000 7.0000 5.7000 0.7500 0.6800 0.6700 0.4200 0.5700 0.7900 0.6300 
Source: Authors' calculation 




Table 6 : Results Summary-GMM Estimation 
Dependent variables: ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
ROAt-1 0.28725*** 0.33982*** 0.32789*** 0.37666*** 0.34191*** 0.35780*** 0.34498*** 
 
(0.05041) (0.06250) (0.06266) (0.06480) (0.06223) (0.06437) (0.06567) 
R&D Intensity -0.23631** -0.28181** -0.26010** -0.26048** -0.19324*** -0.25629** -0.25408** 
 
(0.08563) (0.10288) (0.08913) (0.09520) (0.06910) (0.09413) (0.08076) 
R&D Intensityt-1 0.03551 2.31178 1.41112 0.68702 1.18864 1.78262 0.76198 
 
(0.06217) (1.26212) (0.92249) (0.52561) (0.40095) (1.00559) (0.57232) 
R&D Intensityt-1*Investor Protection Index 
 
2.27678* 





   
(0.89124) 
 R&D Intensityt-1*Disclosure Index 
  
-0.26085 
   
-1.16609** 
   
(0.60801) 
   
(0.45554) 
R&D Intensityt-1*Liability Index 
  
0.14871* 
   
1.11846* 
   
(0.33291) 
   
(0.57915) 
R&D Intensityt-1*Shareholders Suits Index 
  
1.53793** 
   
2.23363** 
   
(0.74181) 
   
(0.73223) 
R&D Intensityt-1*Country Governance Index 









 R&D Intensityt-1*Government Effectiveness 








R&D Intensityt-1*Regularity Quality 








R&D Intensityt-1*Rule of Law 








R&D Intensityt-1*Control of Corruption 








R&D Intensityt-1* Political Stability 








R&D Intensityt-1* Voice & Accountability 








Size 0.01129** 0.01374* 0.01519** 0.01347* 0.01586** 0.01469** 0.01846** 
 
(0.00506) (0.00803) (0.00682) (0.00706) (0.00570) (0.00744) (0.00651) 
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Sales growth 0.01737** 0.01917** 0.01496* 0.01575** 0.01543* 0.01693** 0.01276 
 
(0.00711) (0.00871) (0.00846) (0.00771) (0.00798) (0.00684) (0.00813) 
Leverage -0.27350*** -0.27429*** -0.23070*** -0.21407*** -0.22432*** -0.24778*** -0.22146*** 
 
(0.03671) (0.03333) (0.02717) (0.03062) (0.02689) (0.03209) (0.02650) 
Tangibility -0.13697** -0.19883*** -0.17525*** -0.16131*** -0.14845** -0.17235*** -0.16238*** 
 
(0.04527) (0.04981) (0.04448) (0.04530) (0.04283) (0.04800) (0.04454) 
Financial crisis -0.00495* -0.00888** -0.00839** -0.01154** -0.01037** -0.00981** -0.01186** 
 
(0.00405) (0.00450) (0.00404) (0.00426) (0.00461) (0.00422) (0.00471) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2471 2471 2471 2471 2471 2471 2471 
AR(1) -4.57 -4.53 -4.43 -4.53 -4.48 -4.51 -4.37 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AR(2) 1.42 1.38 1.39 1.61 1.48 1.5 1.36 
P-value 0.1560 0.1680 0.1640 0.1080 0.1380 0.1320 0.1750 
Z1 20.84(9) 23.68(10) 21.29(12) 26.85(10) 19.12(15) 23.79(11) 17.56(18) 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Z2 5.41(3) 3.64(4) 3.53(4) 4.69(4) 5.86(4) 3.34(4) 5.68(4) 
P-value 0.0012 0.0063 0.0076 0.0010 0.0001 0.0104 0.0002 
Hansen J test 116.92(111) 181(159) 244.96(230) 195.63(178) 294.49(272) 223.81(205) 335.37(326) 
P-value 0.3320 0.1120 0.2380 0.1740 0.1670 0.1750 0.3490 
Diff-in-Hansen 28.04(34) 47.88(48) 42.84(63) 31.24(49) 75.49(84) 51.17(55) 86.75(105) 
P-value 0.7540 0.4780 0.9760 0.9770 0.7350 0.6220 0.9020 
Number of groups, n 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 
Instruments, i 124 174 247 193 292 221 349 
Instruments ratio, r=n/i 3.41 2.43 1.71 2.19 1.45 1.91 1.21 
Level of significance: * < .10,  ** < .05,  ***< .01; Standard errors in parenthesis 






Table 7: Robustness Test 
Dependent variables: ROIC Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
ROICt-1 0.30781*** 0.30329*** 0.29673*** 0.33743*** 0.29815*** 0.31159*** 0.30368*** 
 
(0.07341) (0.07038) (0.06940) (0.07122) (0.07156) (0.06987) (0.06922) 
R&D Intensity -34.72517** -31.32344** -32.92282** -33.94852*** -22.13875** -40.78708*** -30.10935** 
 
(13.52455) (9.45126) (9.77934) (9.99837) (8.61178) (11.91322) (9.85959) 
R&D Intensityt-1 7.738035 187.3532 179.1013 150.4718 202.6503 306.1532 43.34213 
 
(10.0003) (113.3602) (132.7653) (111.1707) (58.09552) (124.7232) (78.81748) 
R&D Intensityt-1*Investor Protection Index 
 
187.0076* 





   
(105.1655) 
 R&D Intensityt-1*Disclosure Index 
  
-63.90225* 
   
-207.7785** 
   
(100.4663) 
   
(82.83071) 
R&D Intensityt-1*Liability Index 
  
88.48748** 
   
86.95191* 
   
(38.79364) 
   
(77.86633) 
R&D Intensityt-1*Shareholders Suits Index 
  
157.8912* 
   
283.0295** 
   
(93.23767) 
   
(92.54274) 
R&D Intensityt-1*Country Governance Index 









 R&D Intensityt-1*Government Effectiveness 








R&D Intensityt-1*Regularity Quality 








R&D Intensityt-1*Rule of Law 








R&D Intensityt-1*Control of Corruption 








R&D Intensityt-1* Political Stability 








R&D Intensityt-1* Voice & Accountability 








Size 2.60975* 2.92561** 3.04885*** 3.22232** 2.98814** 3.33154** 3.11889*** 
 
(1.36229) (1.03429) (0.95066) (1.07526) (1.00343) (1.22702) (0.96103) 
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Sales growth 2.65864** 2.64986** 2.40234* 2.73714** 2.51304** 2.57614** 1.91812 
 
(1.26558) (1.20983) (1.25724) (1.28444) (1.23564) (1.14597) (1.17522) 
Leverage -36.69806*** -30.08341*** -29.3741*** -30.50507*** -31.47455*** -36.33074*** -29.77768*** 
 
(5.84827) (4.98402) (4.52403) (4.75495) (4.39568) (5.03920) (3.78119) 
Tangibility -34.06267*** -28.89963*** -32.59003*** -31.0271*** -32.40406*** -29.01143*** -30.60816*** 
 
(7.58122) (6.60811) (8.24477) (7.44983) (7.80353) (6.27389) (7.37271) 
Financial crisis -0.51039* -0.34854** -0.20393** -0.03938* -0.33697* -0.55098* -0.35168* 
 
(0.62735) (0.72709) (0.71194) (0.65956) (0.79329) (0.68871) (0.83559) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 2471 2471 2471 2471 2471 2471 2471 
AR(1) -3.05 -3.02 -3.03 -3.19 -3.04 -3.08 -3.01 
P-value 0.0020 0.0030 0.0020 0.0010 0.0020 0.0020 0.0030 
AR(2) 1.40 1.36 1.31 1.51 1.30 1.41 1.29 
P-value 0.1610 0.1740 0.1900 0.1300 0.1950 0.1580 0.1990 
Z1 15.13(9) 16.61(10) 15.45(12) 16.76(10) 12.83(15) 16.5(11) 17.8(18) 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Z2 2.37(4) 2.41(4) 2.17(4) 2.56(4) 3.18(4) 2.19(4) 2.85(4) 
P-value 0.0519 0.0483 0.0716 0.0381 0.0136 0.0691 0.0237 
Hansen J test 177.64(156) 222.82(183) 245.72(220) 177.97(160) 279.36(256) 191.2(157) 341.17(344) 
P-value 0.1130 0.1240 0.1130 0.1570 0.1510 0.133 0.5330 
Diff-in-Hansen 42.8(43) 48.65(50) 57.25(64) 41.03(50) 78.07(85) 77.65(57) 75.36(105) 
P-value 0.4800 0.5280 0.7120 0.8130 0.6900 0.0330 0.9870 
Number of groups, n 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 
Instruments, i 170 198 237 175 276 173 367 
Instruments ratio, r=n/i 2.49 2.14 1.78 2.42 1.53 2.45 1.15 
Level of significance: * < .10,  ** < .05,  ***< .01; Standard errors in parenthesis 





Table 8: Elasticity Test 
Variables Elasticity 
ROA 0.37730 
R&D Intensity -0.03796 
R&D Intensityt-1 0.02552 
R&D Intensity*Investor Protection  0.16911 
R&D Intensity*Governance  0.03036 
Size 0.88125 
Sales growth 0.02463 
Leverage -0.71381 
Tangibility -0.88949 
Financial crisis -0.03972 
Source: Authors' calculation 
 
 
